In pursuit of the “Dual Carbon” objectives, facilitating the coal mining industry's efficient execution of carbon reduction initiatives is paramount. This article explores the equilibrium and stable strategies among various stakeholders by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government departments, coal mining enterprises, recycling enterprises, and coal mine workers. The impact of varying parameters on the strategic choices of each stakeholder is then simulated using Matlab software. Research indicates that the ideal equilibrium point for this four-party evolutionary game system is (0,1,1,1). Increasing the bonuses provided by government departments to coal mining enterprises and intensifying government supervision both serve to promote carbon reduction behaviors within the coal mining industry. Enhancing the rewards for employees who actively participate in carbon reduction initiatives can effectively boost their motivation. However, increasing the entrusted funds to coal mining enterprises does not encourage them to adopt proactive carbon reduction strategies. In conclusion, recommendations are proposed from the perspectives of government departments, coal mining enterprises, and recycling and reuse enterprises.